Do you think that a majority vote is always the fairest way to reach a consensus? Think again! In this Learn Liberty video, Professor Diana Thomas illustrates a paradoxical outcome that arises when people vote on three or more items — known as Condorcet’s Paradox — and proves that it is quite easy for a savvy politician to manipulate the voting process in this scenario.
Condorcet’s paradox occurs when a vote is taken on a set of three options that nobody ranks in the same order. Even though a vote of two of the options may yield a consistent winner, it’s impossible to achieve a consistent outcome between all three choices. Usually, a majority vote is taken on only two options, so whoever gets to choose which two options are on the table (known as the agenda setter) has the power to dictate the winner of the vote.
Is this voting system fair? Is there a fair way to organize a vote? Discuss below!
Latest posts by Diana Thomas (see all)
"What did Economists Do? Euvoluntary, voluntary, and coercive institutions for collective action" (with William F. Shughart II) forthcoming in the Southern Economic Journal.
“Corporate Lobbying, Political Connections, and the Bailout of Banks” (with Ben Blau and Tyler Brough) Journal of Banking and Finance37(8):3007-3017. 2013.
“Rational Irrationality and the Political Process of Repeal: The Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform and the 21st amendment,” (with Michael Thomas and Nick Snow), Kyklos, 66(1): 130-152. 2013.
“Two-Tiered Political Entrepreneurship and the Congressional Committee System,” (with Adam Martin) Public Choice 154 (1-2): 21-37. 2013.
“Entrepreneurship: Catallactic and Constitutional Perspectives,” (with Michael Thomas) The Review of Austrian Economics, forthcoming.
“In and out of the Commons – Extractive Public Entrepreneurship and the Aggie Blue Bikes Program,” (with Ryan Yonk and Steve Young), Journal of Public and Municipal Finance, 1, 2012.
"The Institutional Context of Epistemic Communities: Experts in PT Bauer's work," Advances in Austrian Economics, 17: 81-97, 2012.
“The Brewer, the Baker, and the Monopoly Maker,” (with Peter Leeson) The Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, 1(1): 84-95, 2011.
“Encouraging a Productive Research Agenda: Peter Boettke and the Devil’s Test,” (with Michael D. Thomas) Journal of Private Enterprise, 26(1):103-115, 2010.
“Bootleggers, Baptists and Political Entrepreneurs: Key Players in the Rational and Morality Play of Regulatory Politics,” (with Randy Simmons and Ryan Yonk) The Independent Review,15(3), 2010.
“Deregulation Despite Transitional Gains – The Brewers Guild of Cologne 1461,” Public Choice,140(3):329-3340, 2009.
“How government regulation of child care harms women” in Sharon Presley and Jan Stover (eds.) The Free Woman (accepted July 2011).
“Regressive Effects of Regulation” Mercatus Center Working Paper No. 12-35, November 2012.
“Brief-Analyses: Increasing the Supply of affordable Child Care” National Center for Policy Analysis, November 30th 2011.
“Increasing the Supply of Affordable Child Care” in Roger Koppl (eds.) “Enterprise Programs: Freeing Entrepreneurs to Provide Essential Services for the Poor – A Task Force Report” National Center for Policy Analysis, August 2011. - Winner of the 2012 Templeton Freedom Award in the Category Free Market Solutions to Poverty.
“Antitrust busybodies,” (with William F. Shughart) The Washington Times, December 19th, 2013.
“Utah’s declining economic freedom,” (with Randy Simmons) The Salt Lake Tribune,
February 13, 2012.
“Many happy returns,” (with Ben Blau and Tyler Brough) The Salt Lake Tribune,
October 22, 2011.
“Regulatory Rent-Seeking,” (with William F. Shughart II), under review (book chapter).
“Alcohol Prohibition in the Beehive: How the Word of Wisdom Became a Commandment,” working paper.
“The law of the taxi – private institutions for the protection of property rights among taxi drivers in Trujillo, Peru” (with Michael Clark and Humberto Alba Castillo), working paper.
“The Treason of Rules: Political Entrepreneurship, Representative Government, and Constitutional Constraints” (with Adam Martin), working paper.
“Efficient Regulation?” (with Michael Thomas), working paper.